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I refer here to the study on trade boycotts that I undertook on 
behalf of the Institute for the Advancement of Calvinism and on 
which this paper is largely based.
When I have to discuss the subject of threatened man as seen 
from an economic angle, this theme would have been somewhat 
negative, should one not look further than the threat alone. 
Therefore it is more positive to discuss the challenges of present- 
day man. This remains my viewpoint throughout: View the eco­
nomic phenomena realistically and identify the threat therein, 
but do not allow the threats o f today ever to become more than 
the challenges of tomorrow and never forget — not only are there 
threats, but so also are there many more opportunities which we 
ought to avail ourselves of through our abilities.
We are certainly able to point out numerous economic threats 
to our Republic and the irony is that we loudly trumpet them 
forth — to the great diversion of exactly those who wish to bring 
our country to her knees. I often ask myself why we always seem 
to take pleasure in the negative view, while the positive side is 
too lightly regarded. In the discussion of this threat against our 
country and its people, I am going to limit myself to briefly out­
lining some of the most important threats and at the same time 
attempt to indicate that the entire situation demands real action. 
Though the threat against South Africa and her people is dis­
cussed here, these phenomena are universal and many of them 
are valid internationally. The approach remains macro, but it 
may also be analysed on a micro level. However, in order 1o il­
lustrate the threat in the present period more fully and clearly,
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I am going to discuss the whole problem o f economic sanctions 
more comprehensively.
1. Inflation
Not so long ago Anton Rupert labelled inflation as our 
“enemy number one”. For the past few years we have grown so 
accustomed to inflation rates of more than ten per cent that we 
tend to assess this threat too lightly. During the twenties a rate o f  
inflation of this magnitutde was termed “galloping inflation” and 
led to disastrous results and chaos by disturbing the whole eco­
nomic order. In this lies our challenge in becoming aware of this 
problem, the action which we can take and the realisation that 
this problem is fundamental to many other threats for which we 
should be prepared. We should also realise that no easy and magi­
cal solution exists, but only the will to work at it first and inde­
pendently and not to wait for someone else, the authorities or 
whoever.
2. Recession
At present we are experiencing a recession which is generally 
considered to be the most serious since the thirties. This is true 
of the whole world and the rate of recovery is very slow. This 
limits the development potential with the result that the 
improvement of the general prosperity is retarded. As a result 
faith in the economic system as well as in the political dispensa­
tion has been undermined. Our greatest challenge here is to 
create a climate of confidence so that a spirit o f expectation and 
enterprise may be created.
3. Unemployment
One of our most serious problems is the relatively high rate of 
unemployment which our country is at present experiencing. It 
would seem as if it is not expected to increase in the coming 
year, but the large number of unemployed remains a serious
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threat. Apart from the direct burden of distress which the un­
employed and their families must shoulder, it also holds the in­
direct danger of frustration and idleness. It creates the opportuni­
ty for activities which do not advance anybody or anything, least 
of all the political and economic stability. The challenge here is 
to create adequate work opportunities. This may seem an impos­
sible task, but should the recession be halted, this may already 
contribute much towards a solution.
4. Balance of payments
South Africa has always been an important trading country. 
This has le i  to great interdependence and perhaps also vulner­
ability. This is discussed more fully later. The balance of pay­
ments and in particular the trading aspect, has been a serious 
source of worry during the last few years as aresult of great defi­
cits. Last year, however, a change set in and a surplus was shown 
which showed an improvement of almost R2 000 million over 
the previous year. Of course, the favourable price of gold will 
exert a further positive influence, but it should not for one single 
moment be forgotten that the balance of payments remains a 
delicate matter in our economy. The same improvement in the 
future is not to be expected and large repayments on debts still 
remain to be made. Pressure will not decrease rapidly. However, 
the present improvement shows that the challenge towards posi­
tive action may be justified by intensified export drives and sub­
stitution of imports by especially buying South African products.
5. Capital and investment
One of the most important problems with regard to the 
balance of payments is the shortage of the influx of capital. As a 
result of the rapid development of South Africa, foreign sources 
had of necessity to be utilized to provide the capital required. In­
ternal political instability, poor returns on investments and the 
poor economic conditions in other countries led to a serious 
reduction in capital from these sources. The challenge we face is
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having to provide an increasing proportion of the capital required 
for such investment from local sources. This will demand greater 
savings and because of the slow growth rate, the former will 
necessitate a reduction- in consumption which in turn will affect 
our standard of living.
6. Standard of living
Complementing the above factors, the decrease in the standard 
of living is a real threat, as it is on this principle that the success 
of economic sanctions is dependent.
7. Economic Sanctions
7.1 Introduction
For many years economic sanctions have been a fundamental 
threat to the Republic of South Africa. Ever since the UNO has 
condemned South Africa’s domestic policy, various measures 
have been adopted to bring South Africa to its knees. Apart from 
political pressure which was openly enforced and which 
apparendy had a limited influence, this was the only other instru­
ment of the UNO and/or other countries in attaining their goal, 
which was to damage the international trade of the RSA to such 
an extent that it would cease altogether.
Before examining the probable influence on and reaction of 
the Republic, it is essential to fully understand how the argument 
of economic sanctions and trade boycotts can be used in reach­
ing political goals. The argument is more or less as follows: Trade 
boycotts have a direct influence on international trade, as both 
import and export can be cut off (although it is not easy to cut 
off imports as long as the victim has enough foreign exchange to 
meet his obligations). The initial attempt is therefore firstly made 
on exports, which results in a slump in all export sectors. At the 
same time it can be expected that a restriction on imports will 
also be detrimental to the import sectors. A cumulative process
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is thus triggered off, which will result in a drop in general income 
for the country. Should the Government try to keep the income 
at a high level, a shortage in production will result, which will lead 
direcdy to inflation.
Both these attempts will result in a decrease in the income of 
the population. This decrease could then put enough pressure on 
the government to force it to change its political attitude. The 
longer these changes can be delayed, the worse living conditions 
in the country will become. Pressure on the government will in­
crease, and if no change should occur, extensive emigration may 
take place. This will weaken the position of the minority govern­
ment even more, to such an extent that the government will be 
overthrown. From this brief and simplistic explanation it is clear 
that the theory rests on the premise that, should the nation’s 
income and standard of living be threatened, it will serve as an 
effective threat to force a country to adopt a different political 
attitude.
Apart from the fact that this premise rests mainly on a 
materialistic approach, and therefore does not take into account 
the versatility and adaptibility of the Christian, one important 
element in the economy of a country should be present before 
economic sanctions can be used as an instrument for political 
objectives. The economic structure of the country involved must 
be constructed in such a way that it should be mainly dependent 
on international economic relations for its economic progress.
Before one can judge the Republic of South Africa’s reaction 
to trade boycotts, one should first examine her dependence on 
international relations. This dependence will determine the pos­
sible influence of economic sanctions. At the same time one 
should try to point out where the arguments fail of those who 
are in favour of trade boycotts.
7.2 The dependence o f  the Republic o f  South Africa on the In ­
ternational Econom y
The first aspect to be investigated is the extent of the Repu­
blic’s international trade with the rest of the world. However,
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this is not the only aspect of importance, because the nature and 
quality of international trade should also be investigated. Apart 
from this, the total participation in the international community 
should be examined, but here one need only to look at the eco­
nomic aspects, since other aspects open up a whole new field of  
study.
It is relatively easy to determine the degree of dependence on 
international trade, as one only has to look at the ratio of inter­
national trade to the gross national product, i.e. the import and 
export of products and services of the country in relation to the 
gross national product. In 1963/64 the ratio for the Republic was 
52 percent, which points to a hig i^ degree of dependence. For 
most other countries, except for the USA, the ratio was also 
high, e.g. for Tanzania 60 percent, for the most Latin-American 
countries an average of 57 percent, for Europe 57 percent, and 
for Asia 47 percent. In some African States the figure was as high 
as 102 percent, and in Europe the figure for the Netherlands was 
94 percent. The exception was the USA with a ratio at 9 percent. 
Since that time the ratio has not altered much. This also holds 
good for the Republic of South Africa. For 1975 the ratio was 
still 52 percent, gold exports excluded. It should be mentioned 
that this figure fell below 40 percent some seven years ago, but 
since then it has risen again to the curren level.
When the analysis is extended, two factors are found to be 
responsible for the Republic’s dependence on international rela­
tions. First there is the sharp 306 percent rise in imports for the 
period 1966 to 1975. In contrast the exports increased by 
R2 400 m, from R1 126 m to R3 618 m. This is an increase of  
just below 200 percent. This large deficit resulted in the second 
factor which was responsible for the great dependence on inter­
national economic relations, i.e. the sharp rise in the value of 
gold production and its resulting export.
In 1966 gold production amounted to R769 m. It increased to 
R2 450 m. in 1975 — an increase of about 220 percent. Gold 
production thus served to balance the great increase in imports. 
Put differently, the availability o f gold enabled the government
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to finance the deficit on imports.
Normally, countries in the early stages of their development 
are greatly dependent on international economic relations. 
Firstly, an underdeveloped country needs capital and capital 
products, such as machines, in its development, but on the other 
hand it also needs a market for its own primary products such as 
agricultural and mining products in order to procure its own capi­
tal. It is also characteristic that the underdeveloped country in its 
process of development gradually becomes less and less depend­
ent on international trade. From this can be deduced — and this 
is important — that the Republic at present still has a more or 
less “open” econom y, and also that overseas countries still have 
confidence in the Republic. Since 1966 there has been a constant 
flow of capital to the Republic, with the exception of 1973 and 
1977, when the reverse was true. The total inflow for 1975 was 
approximately R1 774 m., and in 1976 R1 100 m. This resulted 
in South Africa’s greater dependence, especially as far as private 
investments were concerned. However, it is also positive proof 
that the relations is not one-sided.
The important matter of economic dependence must further 
be illustrated by an analysis of the structure of imports and ex­
ports. Through the years it has become obvious that there has 
been a change in the structure of the South African economy, 
and that import replacement has been practiced for a long time. 
In 1926/27, 76 percent of all clothing was imported, while in 
1963/64 this figure was down to 8 percent. For the same periods 
the figures for metal products were 67 percent and 12 percent, 
for textile products 89 percent and 43 percent, for paper and pa­
per products 91 percent and 23 percent, for basic metals 92 per­
cent and 22 percent, and for transport equipment 73 percent and 
37 percent. Initially this import exchange was an important 
factor, especially up to the 1950’s. However, there are still pos­
sibilities for import exchange, limited mainly to heavy, interme­
diate and capital products industries. The latter is to a large ex­
tent dependent on large markets in order to produce on a compe­
titive basis. In this period the concentration was on extension of
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production for local markets, and not for export. South Africa 
still cannot free herself from this tendency, as is evident from the 
fact that in 1963, 25 percent of the gross national product was 
still imported. In 1968 the figure fell to 21 percent, but was back 
to 26 percent in 1975. Exports also struggles: there was a 
decrease o f 19 percent in relation to the gross national product in 
1957 to 15 percent in 1971, and a further decrease to 14 per­
cent in 1975, but at the moment there is a more positive ten­
dency. This points to the fact that the country does not yet have 
the influence of export markets she would like to have had. 
Another phenomenon is that nowhere in recent history it is evi­
dent that greater productivity has led to greater economic de­
velopment of the country, as throughout more use has had to be 
made of production factors, especially capital, but productivity 
had not much influence in this. The only exception here is the 
mining industry, but here increased productivity was due to the 
production of high quality ore, and in recent years the sharp rise 
in the price of some minerals. It is this phenomenon, which can 
also be termed decreased productivity, which contributed to the 
continuing problem of inflation.
The increasing tempo o f imports up to 1976 can be attributed 
to two factors. First, the relatively high standard of living and 
high income of the population of the Republic have resulted in a 
greater demand for consumer goods, and although the local 
market benefits from this, a great many products are still being 
imported. Several examples can be cited. Where are the ball 
point pens, rulers, spectacle cases, and toys, sold in South Africa 
manufactured? This list can be extended — there are numerous 
such products still being imported. On the other hand, the 
increase in prices has also resulted in a higher value of import 
products, especially when devaluation is taken into account. 
The second factor is the fast economic development experienced 
by the Republic of South Africa up to 1975. Even the tempo in 
recent years is not to be disdained, especially if contrasted with 
international tendencies.
Another relationship pointing to South Africa’s international
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attachment is the fact that South Africa has always had historical 
economic bonds. At first South Africa was part of the British 
Commonwealth, and because of this, trade connections with all 
British and former British colonies increased. Quite a number of 
these are no longer under British rule, and appears to have 
broken ties with South Africa. Secondly, the Republic went to 
great pains not to keep herself out of international organisations. 
The General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) can be men­
tioned as an example. The Republic is a founder member of this 
organisation, and uses the advantages offered, but it also has obli­
gations. Other economic organisations in which the Republic has 
a part are the International Monetary Fund and its affiliations, 
viz. the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. 
These are not the only international economic ties South Africa 
has, for in Southern Africa there exists the Monetary and 
Customs Union of several of these countries. South Africa also 
has a variety of agreements with neighbouring and adjacent Afri­
can states. In recent years more distant African states have been 
involved, and also countries in other continents, such as South 
America and Israel. In many cases these trade agreements are 
more extensive and could even be labelled economic unions in 
some cases.
The abovementioned aspects clearly illustrate that the 
Republic experiences international economic dependence to a 
large degree. Now that we have ascertained the degree of depend­
ence, the influence of economic sanctions and the probability 
thereof can be discussed.
7.3 The influence o f  and reaction to economic sanctions and 
b oyco tts
The results of trade boycotts are centred around the following 
three possibilities:
Firstly, economic sanctions will retard economic growth, as in­
ternational specialisation of labour cannot be used. This means 
that countries affected by these sanctions will not be able to use
their comparative cost advantages, in other words they cannot 
specialize in the products which they can produce cheaper than 
others. This results in a direct rise in costs which will raise the 
price structure in the countries concerned. The danger of the 
detrimental effects of economic sanctions has been eliminated to 
a large extent by the development of international economy, al­
though it still constitutes a threat to lesser developed countries. 
However, it is generally known that lesser developed countries 
will find that their trade conditions will become less favourable, 
i.e. import prices will rise as compared to export prices. This is 
the result and a slower rise of prices of primary products against 
other products, especially in the fields of trade and manufactur­
ing goods. The fact that less developed countries specialize in 
producing primary products, places them in a poor position to 
negotiate, and so economic sanctions can force a country to go 
over to the processing of her own raw materials.
In this specific instance, the Republic can also learn some­
thing. South Africa is one of the leading producers in the world 
when it comes to certain primary products, especially minerals. 
The Republic produces more than 75 percent of the gold in the 
free world, and more gem diamonds than any other country. It is 
also the biggest producer of electro-chrome, copper chrome, pla­
tinum chrome, ferro-chrome, and ferr-manganese in the world; 
it shares with one other country first place as producer of man­
ganese, chromium, and antimony, it is number three on the list 
for the production of asbestos, vanadium, and uranium; it is 
number five in the production of nickel, etc. Furthermore the 
Republic has large iron and coal ore reserves. Most of these pri­
mary products have shown a price increase on the world markets 
over the past two years. In this field the Republic can attain con­
siderable leverage if she could use these minerals in the initial 
stages for her own production processes. On the other hand, eco­
nomic sanctions will force the Republic to do so, but the demand 
for primary products (and to this food may be added) will cause 
most countries to be reluctant to enforce economic sanctions.
One can here refer to Rhodesia. Since 1965 a total ban has
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been placed on international economic relations with Rhodesia. 
Only a few countries, among which was South Africa, did not 
take part. These economic sanctions held great advantages for 
Rhodesia as regards specialization, for although there had been a 
loss of export of primary products (the most important having 
been tobacco and certain minerals), these sanctions forced Rho­
desia to forgo international specialization, at least to some de­
gree. The inevitable result was the development of her own in­
dustries, or, to put it differently, her export structure. But even 
with these comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia, there are 
still numerous countries which do not enforce these sanctions, as 
the primary materials produced by Rhodesia are in great demand 
in the world. It should be noted that the Rhodesian international 
trade was greatly dependent on Britain especially before the en­
forcement of economic sanctions. By 1965 Rhodesian import 
was about 48 percent, and its export 42 percent of the G.N.P. 
In 1972 these figures were 26 percent and 31 percent respective­
ly. Thus Rhodesia has managed to considerably reduce its 
dependence on international economic relations.
The second result of economic boycotts is the limitation of 
economic growth through limiting a country’s import capacity. It 
has to be accepted that less developed countries will be increas­
ingly dependent on international trade. Prebish estimated that, in 
order to attain a 5 percent economic growth in a less developed 
country, a minimum propensity to import of 6 percent would be 
needed. It has already been pointed out that the import of 
capital and intermediate products is a necessary requirement to 
stimulate economic growth in less developed countries. This is to 
a greater extent true for countries which are in the first stages of 
economic development. The Republic of South Africa is still a 
good buyer abroad of capital and other durable items, and it can­
not be doubted that, should South Africa be forced to do so, she 
has the potential to supply in her own needs. It is only logical to 
expect that short-term trade boycotts will have a detrimental ef­
fect on economic growth, but the influence in the long run is 
what counts, and in this respect it would seem that the detri­
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mental effects can be eliminated to a great extent. Here one can 
once again refer to Rhodesia. There had been a definite decrease 
in economic activity directly after the introduction of economic 
sanctions, but within three years Rhodesia was back on the pre­
vious level, and since then the economic growth has progressed at 
a surprising rate, despite the fact that the country has to yield 
great productivity and technical skills in her fight for security. 
The important requirement in this instance is that a country 
should have the potential to convert the restrictions on her im­
port capacity in the application of productive sources in the 
country herself. In this regard the strategic import products such 
as oil will necessarily affect economic growth adversely. About 
South Africa’s position little needs to be said, for with the 
exception of the oil-producing countries, the Republic is one of 
the few countries which, because of her mineral resources, can 
look after her own energy requirements, thus cutting imports 
down to a minimum. The fact that such strategic products can 
only with difficulty influence a country’s economic activities, 
does not provide an attractive medium for trade boycotts.
A third result of economic sanctions is that they have direct 
advantages for the industrial development of the country con­
cerned, as implied above. It is a fact that when import products 
are not readily available, they become more expensive. The result 
is that local products become more competitive and profit mar­
gins become higher, which makes it more attractive to invest in 
these industries. Without entering into a discussion, Rhodesia’s 
economy can again be referred to. The period of economic iso­
lation forced Rhodesia to work out an intensive programme of 
import substitution, and a more productive application of her 
natural resources.
It has been mentioned that the economic productivity of the 
Republic has not progressed as expected, and leaves some scope 
for improvement. The most important requirement is that op­
portunities must exist to develop her own industries. In the case 
of Rhodesia, which has been greatly dependent on international 
trade, there was a large variety of possibilities to start various in­
dustries with a reasonable possibility of success. But easy and ob­
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vious alternatives arc soon exhausted because internal markets 
are limited, in otiier words, the supply of consumer articles is in­
volved. The next phase to capital and heavy products requires 
greater investments and technical skills, and also bigger markets, 
and these are not always easily to come by. This is one of the 
reasons why there has been such a drastic decrease in Rhodesia’s 
productivity. South Africa has already reached a high level of 
economic development and the similar possibilities which have 
been utilised by Rhodesia at the onset of trade boycotts have al­
ready been exhausted. Should economic boycotts against South 
Africa become a reality, less advantage will be obtained from the 
protection of local industries. One can thus understand why 
some strategic industries had to be started without the existence 
of trade boycotts. South African should not ignore the .absence 
of all strategic industries, as is proved by the fact that such in­
dustries do exist. There is evidence that even heavy industries 
may develop if South Africa is forced to do so. It should be stres­
sed that economic boycotts in this field will never be quite ef­
fective, as so many methods exist these days to get around them. 
A country can obtain almost any product if she is able to pay for 
it, and South Africa has always had her gold. South Africa only 
has to make her investment potential more attractive. This will 
lead to an influx of capital which can then be applied to increase 
the tempo of development.
Another aspect which also has to be taken into account is the 
relations with the countries with which economic agreements (es­
pecially trade agreements) exist. Here South Africa is quite vul­
nerable, as the Republic traditionally has had economic ties with 
only certain countries. For example, 30 percent of the Republic’s 
import and exports is with Great Britain. It is possible to apply 
economic sanctions more effectively in such instances. On the 
other hand, Rhodesia has proven that there are other countries 
which are willing to fill such gaps. Here it should be mentioned 
that the trade structure of the Republic has undergone a greater 
diversification in the past few years, as Western Europe (especial­
ly West Germany), Japan, and some of the African States have 
become more important economic partners.
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Another factor which influences South Africa favourably, is 
her membership of numerous international organisations. The 
GATT, and the IMF and its related organisations make it difficult 
for countries to discriminate against South Africa as far as inter­
national trade is concerned. Geographical situation and economic 
leadership in Southern Africa are also two reasons for countries 
being reluctant to use sanctions, since it will be all the states in 
Southern Africa that will suffer and not South Africa alone.
8. Summary
Economic sanctions can only be enforced effectively when a 
decrease of 17 percent in the real income of the population be­
comes evident. From what has been said above, it is clear that 
one cannot see this happening in the Republic of South Africa. 
The adoption of trade boycotts usually rests on one-sided and 
simple arguments which do not take into account the Christ­
ian’s adaptability and perseverance. It has been clearly de­
monstrated that, at the moment, the institution of economic 
sanctions against South Africa is a threat that should not cause 
too much concern. It would be wise for South Africa to strength­
en her position in the world economy so that she will become 
even more indispensable. This means that a policy of isolation 
should not be followed. Instead, more extensive economic rela­
tionships should be entered into, to the extent of moving South 
Africa up from the fourteenth position on the list of the most 
important trade countries in the world. South Africa will have to 
intensify her export drive so that countries abroad will become 
more dependent on her. This is also a prerequisite for sufficient 
interior economic development. There is no doubt that South 
Africa has the potential to ward off economic sanctions. In the 
short term this will call for sacrifices, but in the long run it is to 
be doubted whether economic sanctions can be enforced success­
fully against the Republic o f South Africa in the next few years.
This, however, is no reason to sit back and relax. South Africa 
is threatened economically — this is true beyond any doubt. It is
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the duty of every Christian to be fully informed as to the possi­
ble consequences of this threat. How will we react as believers? 
Are we going to adopt a wait-and-see attitude? This will only in­
tensify the threat and will offer no solution. There is no 
alternative but to see these threats and challenges as an 
opportunity to prove our call and responsibility as believing 
Christians. This is a responsibility which allows no looking back, 
which lives and looks ahead, which turns threats into challenges 
and weaknesses into power points, so that our country will be 
forced to the top by powerful, aggressive action.
* *
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